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Mark Freedland*  Employment Law Revisited
This critique of Brian Langille’s famous “Subset” article considers the historical and 
current meaning of “employment law” in Canada and in the UK. In Canada, “employment 
law” was fashioned by Innis Christie in the 1980s as the law of personal work relations 
for the non-unionized sector, with “labour law” applying to the unionized sector of 
the economy.  In the UK, “individual employment law” appeared in the 1970s to be a 
distinct discipline; but since that time it has largely re-merged with labour law, with the 
terms “employment law” and “labour law” becoming virtually synonymous. An enlarged 
scope is proposed for the whole subject as “work relations law,” in which individual 
and collective elements are combined; and finally it is argued that Langille’s seminal 
article proposed a similar over-arching framework for the subject as a whole, rather 
than subordinating its collective to its individual aspect as it initially appears to do.
La présente critique du célèbre article de Brian Langille « Labour Law is a Subset 
of Employment Law » examine la signification historique et actuelle du « droit de 
l’emploi » au Canada et au Royaume-Uni. Au Canada, le « droit de l’emploi » a été 
conçu par Innis Christie dans les années 1980 comme le droit des relations de travail 
personnelles pour le secteur non syndiqué, alors que le « droit du travail » s’appliquait 
au secteur syndiqué de l’économie.  Au Royaume-Uni, le « droit individuel de l’emploi  » 
est apparu dans les années 1970 comme une discipline distincte ; mais depuis lors, 
il a largement fusionné avec le droit du travail, les termes « droit de l’emploi » et 
« droit du travail » étant devenus pratiquement synonymes. Nous proposons un champ 
d’application élargi pour aborder l’ensemble du sujet en tant que « droit des relations 
de travail », dans lequel les éléments individuels et collectifs sont combinés; et enfin, 
nous avançons que l’article fondateur de Langille proposait un cadre global similaire 
pour l’ensemble du sujet, plutôt que de subordonner son aspect collectif à son aspect 
individuel comme il semblait le faire initialement.
* Professor Mark Freedland QC (Hon), FBA, is Emeritus Professor of Employment Law in the 
University of Oxford and an Emeritus Research Fellow of St John’s College Oxford. He is also an 
Honorary Professor in the Faculty of Laws of University College London.  He is specially indebted to 
the anonymous reviewers for their comments, particularly with regard to Canadian labour law, many 
of which have been gratefully adopted.
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Introduction
My agreement to contribute to this Special Issue has had an outcome 
different from the one I originally imagined. I had contemplated writing 
a straightforward evaluation of Brian Langille’s famous article, “Labour 
Law is a Subset of Employment Law.”1 Instead, I have found myself 
involved in a more complex and multi-faceted engagement with the 
ideas that animate his article. It is an engagement that has required me 
to revisit the notion of “employment law,” to consider what I and others 
have meant by “employment law,” and to explore what “employment law” 
can and should aspire to achieve. This is an engagement that culminates 
in a re-consideration and possible re-imagining of the categories both of 
“employment law” and of “labour law.” 
The main starting point for this unexpectedly far-reaching exploration 
was an arrangement to participate in a session of Anglo-Canadian 
comparative discussion at the Labour Law Research Network conference 
in Toronto in 2017. Perhaps for all the contributors, and certainly for me, 
the main point of comparison between the UK system and the Canadian 
one consisted in their historically and currently different understandings 
of the relationship between “labour law” and “employment law.” In the 
UK, the two terms have become largely interchangeable: in Canada, by 
contrast, they denote two distinct legal topics, or even two separate legal 
disciplines. Canadian labour law is seen as being collective in nature 
and applicable to the unionized sector of the workforce, while Canadian 
employment law is seen as individual in character and applicable to the 
non-unionized sector. No such clear distinction can be made in the law of 
the UK: the equivalent body of law has some collective aspects and some 
1. (1981) 31 UTLJ 200 [“Langille, Subset”].
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individual ones, but is nevertheless seen as being an essentially unitary 
one, applicable both to the unionized and non-unionized sectors of the 
workforce, which can be equally suitably referred to as “labour law” or 
“employment law.”
It will be noted that I have characterized the contrast between these 
two visions of the relationship between labour law and employment law as 
a partly historical one. They do indeed reflect two different, though partly 
interactive, legal evolutions in the domain of work relations as between 
the UK and Canada. The Canadian system had its origins in that of the 
UK, but had also been reflective of that of the USA: Canadian labour law 
had in the decades following World War II taken on many of the features 
of US collective labour law, which is centred upon a system of compulsory 
union recognition and collective bargaining, and had therefore replicated 
that system’s sharply defined and maintained restriction to the unionized 
sector of the workforce. This was its essential state and condition by the 
beginning of the 1980s; the UK, however, having engaged in a short-lived 
USA-style legislative experiment in the early 1970s, had ceased to draw 
any such clear line by the end of that decade.
If we can regard the foregoing description as having captured, with 
the broadest of brushstrokes, two contrasting pictures of the state of the art 
in Canada and the UK at a certain historical moment, we can also observe 
that, at that very moment, Brian Langille as a young and brilliant scholar 
burst upon this apparently settled scene with a major challenge to the 
Canadian legal typology as I have described it. This challenge consisted 
of his deeply provocative suggestion that, far from regarding Canada as 
having two distinct and parallel legal systems in the domain of labour 
or employment relations, we should, apparently, regard the one as part 
of, even in a sense subordinated to, the other. This was his celebrated 
proposition, nailed to the church door in Dalhousie, that “labour law is a 
subset of employment law.”2
This was a provocative proposition because it appeared to identify 
employment law as being on a trajectory on which it would, and should, not 
only complement labour law but actually subsume it. This was therefore 
not just about the relative scope and coverage of the two disciplines 
but also about their purposes and objectives. Moreover, I believe that it 
presented a similar set of issues, albeit in a much less stark and obvious 
form, for UK law as those which it raised for Canadian law. In order to 
isolate and understand those issues, we need to go back more deeply 
into the history leading up to “Subset,” and then to carry this narrative 
2. Ibid, title and passim.
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and evaluation forward into the present. This enquiry is conducted in 
three sections, entitled respectively: (I) the construction of employment 
law, (II) the evolution of employment law, and (III) the re-integration of 
employment law and labour law.
 I. The construction of employment law
This section presents Professor Innis Christie as the architect or pathfinder 
of a process of construction of “employment law” as distinct from “labour 
law” in Canada, and suggests that a somewhat comparable though less 
prominent process of construction was occurring in the UK, and furthermore 
that the latter process had some influence upon the former one. Although 
there is nothing in the development of British legal scholarship that exactly 
corresponds to Innis Christie’s development of Canadian “employment 
law,” there are significant parallels between his work, and the work that 
was being done in Britain at that period to develop the exposition of 
the law of the individual employment relationship; and I think that this 
conjunction provides an interesting starting point for some comparative 
reflections upon the subsequent evolutions in both jurisdictions.
The construction of employment law in Canada is inseparably associated 
with the work and scholarship of Innis Christie, in his time as Professor 
in and Dean of the Law Faculty at Dalhousie University. It was he who 
initiated the teaching of Employment Law as a distinct subject at Dalhousie 
and in Canada at large in the 1970s, and who published the foundational 
treatise on employment law for Canada in 1980. This achievement has 
been celebrated in a succession of annual lectures and seminars held at 
Dalhousie to commemorate Innis Christie and his work; Professor Harry 
Arthurs gave the first lecture in 2011, and  Professor Brian Langille 
followed with the second lecture in 2012. Harry Arthurs’ subsequently 
published Inaugural Innis Christie Lecture provides an insightful account 
of Innis Christie’s work of the construction of employment law, and of 
what his aims and methodology had been during that process.3 I could not 
equal that account of the beginnings of employment law in Canada; but I 
can elaborate the comparison with the parallel and somewhat functionally 
equivalent developments in the UK, and also draw out an interesting thread 
of historical interaction, at a certain moment in time, between the impulses 
towards the articulation of “employment law” in Canada on the one hand 
and in the UK on the other. So I begin by developing more fully the 
distinction between “labour law” and “employment law” as a matter both 
3. Harry Arthurs, “Charting the Boundaries of Labour Law: Innis Christie and the Search for an 
Integrated Law of Labour Market Regulation” (2011) 34:1 Dal LJ 1.
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of concept and of terminology. The main point is that, although we find the 
same duality of terminology between “labour law” and “employment law” 
in Britain as we do in North America, the relationship between those two 
terminologies in British law has been very different from the relationship 
between the two terminologies in the laws of Canada or the US; and this 
difference betokens some underlying conceptual or structural differences 
between those legal systems. 
If we take the mid-to-late 1960s as our chronological starting point, 
at the time when the academic discipline was taking shape, the structure 
and terminology of the law concerning collective and individual labour 
or employment relations was more hard-edged in Canada than in Britain. 
In Canada, there was a highly-regulated and structured regime for labour 
relations and collective bargaining that applied to the unionized sector of 
the labour market, similar to the National Labour Relations Board/Wagner 
Act system in the US. That legal regime was known as “labour law” and 
was the subject of well-developed theoretical and practical exposition. But 
outside that sector and that regime, there was an absence of structured 
or focused legal regulation of employment relations, a hardly charted 
territory in which the prevailing legal norms were those of the common 
law, characterized by a scarcely questioned stereotype coming fairly close 
to that of the “contract at will,” which was undoubtedly the dominant 
paradigm in the US.
In Britain at that time, against the background of a vigorous system 
of voluntary collective bargaining, there was a much less highly regulated 
and structured legal regime for collective labour relations, or “industrial 
relations” as they were then styled. There was a body of legal regulation of 
individual employment relations that was primarily governed by the norms 
of the common law of the contract of employment (still often known as 
the “master and servant contract”), but upon which was gradually being 
superimposed a “floor” of statutory protections for employees, enforceable 
in a new body of embryonic labour courts known as “industrial tribunals.” 
This body of law, previously known as “industrial law” or “the law of 
master and servant,” did not formally differentiate between a unionized 
and a non-unionized sector, though its practical outcomes for workers 
differed greatly as between those two sectors. As the academic study of 
that body of law in Britain gathered pace through the 1960s and 1970s, it 
did so increasingly under the title of “labour law”; this was very much, as 
we shall see, under the influence of the undoubted doyen of the subject, 
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Otto Kahn-Freund, for whom this terminology of “labour law” was always 
the preferred one.4 
So by the late 1960s the terminology of “labour law” prevailed both in 
Canada and in Britain; but it referred to differently structured legal regimes 
with different spheres of application. There was then an interesting twist in 
the story, whereby the idea and terminology of “employment law” came 
onto the scene in both systems but did so in rather different ways, each 
contingent upon its own existing national legal context as I have described 
it.  In both systems, there was an increasing impulse to enhance and 
rationalize the legal protection of individual workers, at the levels both of 
practical law-making and theoretical exposition, the activity at those two 
levels being mutually complementary. This was essentially an attempt to 
chart and develop the worker-protective potential of the law of the contract 
of employment, and, where that was lacking or deficient, which was in large 
measure the case, to build a legislative (and in part constitutional, especially 
in Canada) superstructure of employment rights and employment equality 
law upon those often shaky foundations. In Canada, this pursuit was 
fairly conceived of under the heading of “employment law.” This was the 
intellectual and practical activity in which Innis Christie was undoubtedly 
engaged, presenting that work as the introduction of a new academic and 
practical discipline. At the outset “employment law” represented, and I 
believe still represents, a distinctive pursuit from that of collective labour 
law, still basically applying to a distinct cohort of workers—those in the 
(increasingly large) non-unionized sector. 
However, from the vantage point of the present day, the evolution of 
the terminology and of the disciplinary or pedagogical structure can be seen 
to have been a very different one in the UK. It is true that, in the course of 
the 1970s in particular, there were signs that “individual employment law” 
might be emerging as a distinct pursuit from that of “labour law,” with 
much the same prospectus as that which I have identified for Canadian 
“employment law.” But it is now apparent that the separation between the 
two was never anything like as complete as it has been in Canada, either in 
terms of legal subject-matter or in terms of a sectoral division between the 
unionized and non-unionized workforces. And moreover, even that partial 
4. One of the first occasions on which Kahn-Freund used the terminology of “labour law” (in the 
English language) in published work was in an Anglo-Canadian comparative context, namely when 
giving the WM Martin Lectures in the University of Saskatchewan in 1967, published as Otto Kahn-
Freund, Labour Law: Old Traditions and New Developments (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co, 1968). 
He would later go on to deliver his Hamlyn Lectures, his classic exposition of the subject, under the 
title of “Labour and the Law,” published as Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (London: Stevens, 
1972).
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disjunction between “labour law” and “employment law,” which seemed 
to be presenting itself in the 1970s, has tended to fade away, so that the 
two terminologies have become largely synonymous, both settling down 
into being names for a single legal subject or discipline embracing both 
collective and individual employment relations. If one chooses the name 
“labour law” there is still a slight implication that the emphasis might 
be on the collective aspects, with the opposite, individual, emphasis for 
“employment law”; but, like the Cheshire Cat, this distinction has virtually 
evaporated, leaving only a grin.  
All that said, it is still useful to hark back to that time in the 1970s 
when “employment law” was being cultivated as a distinct legal discipline 
in Canada and showed some signs of becoming so in the UK. This process 
of cultivation in Canada is recognized as having been the special work of 
Innis Christie, and it is clear that he planted a tree that took root and grew 
apace. There was something going on in the UK that was loosely parallel; 
I think we can specially associate it with the work of Bob Hepple and Paul 
O’Higgins. It now appears as a somewhat ephemeral phenomenon, at least 
in the sense that “employment law” did not become a discipline distinct 
from that of labour law in the UK; but it was a significant tendency in its 
own way, and moreover it was one that, I now believe, had an influence 
on the work of Innis Christie in Canada. This argument merits a fuller 
exposition.
The story of “employment law” in the UK provides an interesting study 
of the way in which legal disciplines or sub-disciplines evolve within legal 
systems generally, and in particular in the domain of labour, employment, 
or work relations. I venture two general preliminary observations, which 
seem specially applicable in this instance. Firstly, these evolutions are 
typically much less clearly determined from the outset than hindsight 
makes them appear. Indeed, it is often far from obvious when the outset 
occurred; and even when that is reasonably clear, we have to allow for 
an often long period of subsequent indeterminacy during which the 
epistemology of a legal discipline or sub-discipline, and its relationship 
with other disciplines or sub-disciplines, has not yet become settled. 
My second preliminary observation is that the construction of a legal 
discipline or sub-discipline tends to be driven by two kinds of purpose, 
and that these two kinds of purpose operate in many different degrees of 
combination with each other. We normally find that a process of formation 
of a legal discipline has on the one hand a general purpose and on the other 
hand a specific one, which shape the process in various different degrees. 
Where a new legal discipline or sub-discipline is being constructed, it will 
usually be for the general purpose of providing a well-developed and well-
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reasoned legal exposition and analysis in an area where such exposition 
and analysis is perceived as deficient. However, the process of construction 
may also be driven by some more specific normative purpose, that is to 
say some perception that a specific goal could be achieved, or at least 
more nearly achieved, by means of the formation of a new distinct legal 
discipline or sub-discipline.
Thus, in the domain of labour, employment, or work relations, the 
initial formation of an over-arching legal discipline from the middle of the 
twentieth century onwards, increasingly under the title of “labour law,” had 
the general purpose of proving a clear exposition and doctrinal analysis of 
a body of a law that was growing in substance, complexity and practical 
importance. This has typically been combined with a more specific 
purpose, which has tended to be in the nature of providing protection, 
security, or justice to workers in their relations with their employers. But 
there have been a great variety of views about how far and how best to 
pursue those specific purposes, and how to combine or reconcile them 
with other goals such as that of maximizing the economic efficiency of 
employing enterprises. 
Moreover, there has been a divergence as to whether those purposes 
should be perceived as collective or as individual ones, to be pursued 
by the creation and enforcement of collective or individual rights and 
obligations. This has been a source of tension which gives rise and helps 
to explain divergent approaches to the relationship between “labour law” 
and “employment law.” It enables us to identify and understand how 
“employment law,” or more specifically “individual employment law,” 
seemed to be crystallizing as a distinct sub-discipline in the UK during 
the early 1970s, and why that crystallization in the UK exerted a crucial 
influence upon Innis Christie’s construction of employment law in Canada.
When recounting that episode in the history of “employment law,” 
it is important to remind ourselves that the emergence of an overarching 
legal discipline in the domain of industrial relations, labour relations, or 
employment relations, was still very recent; it was a discipline that took 
shape in the UK in the course of the 1960s—and as I have indicated, it 
did so mainly under the banner of “labour law,” which quickly supplanted 
the names of “industrial law” or “the law of master and servant.” At 
one point it seemed possible that the whole territory might be described 
as that of “employment law”; in 1963 Gerald Fridman published an 
encyclopaedic treatise on the subject, under the title of “The Modern Law 
of Employment,” which enjoyed a moment in the sunshine as the leading 
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work of reference for practitioners in the field.5 This was not, however, 
destined to become the prevailing terminology during that period; when 
Bill Wedderburn, pursuing at the London School of Economics a path 
which Otto Kahn-Freund had been opening up since the 1950s, became a 
principal protagonist of this newly emerging academic discipline, he did 
so firmly in the name of “labour law.”6 Roger Rideout, my first teacher of 
the subject at University College London, adopted the same nomenclature 
when he presented his outline of the principles of the subject in 1972.7
I think that for these founders of the discipline in the UK, the insistence 
on the terminology of “labour law” expressed their normative concern that 
it would maintain a collectivist orientation, and a real anxiety, or at least 
ambiguity of feeling, about the way in which it seemed to be taking on 
an individualist one. Kahn-Freund had inculcated, and Wedderburn had 
inherited, the profound conviction that the essential task of the law of the 
UK in the domain of industrial relations was to sustain and uphold the 
collective voice and power of workers as expressed by the trade union 
movement. They would always struggle with the paradox that, given the 
underlying anti-collectivistic disposition of the common law judges of the 
UK and its Parliament at most times, the role of the law needed to be a 
very limited one—indeed a minimal one—if that normative goal was to 
be achieved. 
As the power of the trade union movement and the coherence of the 
system of collective bargaining began to fragment and decline in the 
1960s, they could see that the “method of legislation” would need to 
be increasingly relied upon to take up this collective worker-protective 
function. This was quite a bitter pill to swallow and the source of a 
continuing regret at the need for an increasing juridification of work 
relations. I think they particularly struggled with the accurate but painful 
perception, which had been evident to Kahn-Freund for a very long time, 
5. GHL Fridman, The Modern Law of Employment (London: Stevens, 1963). Gerald Fridman’s 
academic career was itself an interesting cross-over between the UK and Canada. His legal education 
took place at St John’s College Oxford, and The Modern Law of Employment was written while he was 
a Lecturer in the Law Faculty of Sheffield University, itself a leading early centre of labour law studies 
in the UK. He later emigrated to Canada, specializing in private law and becoming in due course a 
Professor in the Law Faculty of Western University, Ontario and a Fellow of the Royal Society of 
Canada. 
6. Thus in the original edition of “The Worker and the Law”—KW Wedderburn, The Worker and 
the Law (London: Penguin Books, 1965) at 7—he said of that book that “[i]t sketches the development 
and current state of our ‘Labour Law’” (ibid at 7, Preface). And the first chapter has the title “The 
Foundations of Labour Law.” Two years later, he published his highly influential book of cases and 
materials, KW Wedderburn, Cases and Materials on Labour Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1967).
7. Roger W Rideout, Principles of Labour Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1972).
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that in the British legal context this juridification would have to be located 
in the individual employment relationship and centred upon that dubious 
and suspect legal institution, the individual contract of employment. They 
duly set about the task of performing and commissioning a modernization 
of the law of the individual employment relationship and individual 
employment contract: but they were I think never free from collectivist 
misgivings as they did so. 
At all events, this juridification of employment relations in the UK 
continued apace from its point of departure in the Contracts of Employment 
Act 1963; around that legislation and the Redundancy Payments Act 
1965, there was a rapid build-up of employment litigation in the newly-
created industrial tribunals and in the higher courts on appeal from them. 
Moreover, it soon became apparent that the new legislation was placing 
heavy demands upon the law of the contract of employment, in the sense 
that the new statutory “floor of rights” was often dependent upon an 
elaborate interaction with the common law of the contract of employment. 
In that sense, it could be said that there was a rapidly developing body of 
individual employment law, which was constructed around two central 
pillars that were essentially inter-connected—–that of the common law 
of the contract of employment, and that of the statute law of individual 
employment rights.
All this would not alone have been sufficient to bring about a splitting-
off of “individual employment law” from “labour law” in the UK. A 
further crucial event occurred in 1971, consisting of the enactment of the 
Industrial Relations Act. This was an ill-fated and short-lived experiment 
in a kind of comprehensive juridification of industrial relations and 
employment relations.  Collective industrial relations were subjected to a 
regime of statutory regulation which was somewhat similar to those of the 
USA and Canada, but which was perceived and experienced by the British 
trade union movement as an intervention that was intentionally hostile 
to trade unions and their memberships. On the other hand, in a counter-
balancing move, the Industrial Relations Act had been fashioned so as to 
improve quite radically the employment rights of individual workers by 
introducing a new right of employees not to be unfairly dismissed from 
their employment.
At this juncture, in a highly significant doctrinal development, Bob 
Hepple and Paul O’Higgins evidently decided that it was appropriate 
to demarcate and develop a distinct discipline to be named “Individual 
Employment Law,” and they implemented that intention by publishing 
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a short treatise under that title.8 In so doing, they were animated by the 
idea that, in the environment of the Industrial Relations Act, individual 
employment law was going to be the best if not the only legal resource for 
securing the protection of the rights and interests of workers.9 Moreover, 
they would have had it in mind that there was now going to be an 
intensifying need for expert exposition of the complex interaction between 
the common law of the contract of employment and the statute law of 
individual employment rights—a need which would be enhanced by the 
onset of statutory employment equality rights, already manifested by the 
enactment of the Equal Pay Act in 1970. Thus “individual employment 
law” was constructed as a distinct legal discipline in the UK. 
This was a fairly short-lived construction in the UK, where it did 
not survive beyond the mid-1970s in such a distinct form. However, it 
is clear that this initiative, coupled with the work that was being done at 
that period to develop the law of the contract of employment in the UK, 
served as a significant exemplar and encouragement to Innis Christie as 
he pursued his mission of constructing a new discipline of Employment 
Law alongside that of Labour Law in Canada. Thus in the Preface to the 
original edition of his “Employment Law in Canada,” published in 1980, 
Innis expressed his gratitude for their contributions:
I will also take this opportunity to thank two men I have never met and 
one whom I knew only slightly some years ago. As will be obvious 
to anyone who reads this book, I owe a considerable intellectual debt 
to the authors of Hepple and O’Higgins on Employment Law,10 an 
English text which stresses the importance of legislation in today’s law 
of employment, and to M.R. Freedland, the author of The Contract of 
Employment (1976), for his acute analysis of the contractual elements of 
the employment relationship, which are common to the law of England 
and Canada.11
I seek to return the compliment by means of this little exercise in the 
historical exegesis of “employment law,” and by considering, in the 
remaining sections of this paper, what has subsequently become, and what 
8. BA Hepple & Paul O’Higgins, Individual Employment Law: An Introduction (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1971).
9. Thus they said: “The aim of this book is to provide an introduction to the law affecting the 
individual employment relationship. The passing of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 has made it 
vitally important to re-examine this aspect of Labour Law. Most of the public debate on labour relations 
has concentrated on the new collective rights and liabilities. The Act is of hardly less significance for 
the relations between the individual worker and his [sic] employer” (ibid at 7).
10. This was accurate; by 1980, their book had been so re-named: BA Hepple & Paul O’Higgins, 
Employment Law, 3rd ed by BA Hepple (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1979).
11. Innis Christie, Employment Law in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), Preface at ix.
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might in future become of “employment law.” In accordance with the 
brief for this paper, I shall do so with special reference to Brian Langille’s 
famous thesis that “labour law is a subset of employment law.” 
II. The evolution of employment law
In the previous section, I sought to show how and why, by the beginning of 
the 1980s, “individual employment law” had been marked out and declared 
an independent legal discipline, in similar though far from identical ways 
both in the UK and in Canada. In this section, I consider the subsequent 
destinies of that discipline in those two jurisdictions, concentrating 
in particular upon the implications of Brian Langille’s proposition that 
“labour law is a subset of employment law.” As I have indicated in the 
course of this paper, the proposition is a provocative one in that, although 
it appears to be a formal and factual statement about an existing hierarchy 
of disciplinary categories special to the Canadian legal system, it turns 
out on fuller examination to be a substantive, predictive, and normative 
argument that could also apply to the legal system of the UK. Understood 
as such, it provides a piercing optic through which to survey and evaluate 
the evolution of “employment law” in both jurisdictions.
So, to clear the ground, we can begin that survey at the formal and 
factual level by confirming to ourselves that when Langille asserted in 
1981 that “labour law is a subset of employment law,” he was not making 
an accurate statement about Canadian law, and that his assertion had 
no meaningful application in UK law. By that time, Innis Christie had 
established employment law as a distinct discipline in Canada, but I do 
not think that he could have claimed, nor would have wished to claim, 
that employment law enjoyed an hierarchical supremacy over labour 
law as the prevalent legal discipline for the whole domain of labour and 
employment relations. And the assertion simply did not make sense with 
regard to UK law: although “individual employment law,” had seemed to 
shape up as a distinct discipline in the early 1970s, it had in the course of 
that decade largely merged with “labour law,” becoming an aspect of the 
larger subject12; and moreover “employment law” and “labour law” were 
rapidly becoming interchangeable terminologies referring to the same 
legal discipline.13
12. The bibliographical history of Hepple & O’Higgins, Individual Employment Law is itself 
illustrative of that evolution: see supra note 11 for its subsequent renaming as Employment Law; 
moreover, from the time of its original publication in 1972, it also formed the first part of Hepple & 
O’Higgins’ Encyclopedia of Labour Relations Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1972), which became 
Sweet & Maxwell’s Encyclopedia of Employment Law under the general editorship of RV Upex from 
1992 onwards. 
13. That convergence of terminology culminated in the present-day situation in which some of the 
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However, Brian Langille would I think be perfectly willing to agree 
with that evaluation of his argument; he would have been the first to 
concede that his proposition was not really intended to depict a formal 
hierarchy of disciplinary categories that existed in Canada in 1981, and 
still less intended to be applicable in the UK in any formal sense. That 
is because in my view he saw himself as engaged in a different kind 
of discourse—namely that of making a substantive, predictive, and 
essentially normative argument, primarily for Canadian law but that might 
as such have some application to other legal systems as well. It certainly 
represented the view that “employment law” perhaps would, but much 
more importantly should, become a more important legal genre in the 
domain of labour or employment relations. Even on the face of it, “Subset” 
appeared to be a claim that it would be desirable actually to reverse the 
existing primacy of collective labour law over individual employment 
law in the Canadian legal system by reason of what he saw as the latter’s 
normatively superior substance and content. I begin by taking that reading 
at its face value, though in the concluding section of this paper I advance 
a different view of what was ultimately intended, much more to do with a 
synthesis between individual employment law and collective labour law 
than with the primacy of the former over the latter. 
However, this was, if taken at face value, a much more ambitious 
claim for the discipline of “employment law” as it was newly emerging 
in Canada, than its founding father Innis Christie would have made for it, 
and it is important to understand why Brian Langille advanced that bold 
and in a sense aggressive proposition. Innis Christie was by all accounts 
a practical and pragmatic legal scholar who was content for employment 
law to grow up alongside labour law, gradually gaining a kind of natural 
parity with, and eventually predominance over, labour law by reason 
of the steady decline in collective bargaining and contraction of the 
unionized sector of the workforce; but Brian Langille seemed to want that 
balance to be shifted further and faster than natural process would allow. 
It is important to consider the reasons for that special enthusiasm on Brian 
Langille’s part.
general textbooks that cover the whole subject in both its individual and collective aspects are styled 
as “labour law”—for example, Simon Deakin & Gillian Morris, Labour Law, 6th ed (London and 
Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2012), while others are styled as “employment law”—for instance, 
ACL Davies, Employment Law (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2015). It is sometimes now the case that 
the leading British authorities will variously use or be party to the use of either terminology to describe 
works with a similarly comprehensive scope; compare for example Hugh Collins, Employment Law, 
2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press Clarendon Law Series, 2010); Hugh Collins, KD Ewing, 
& Aileen McColgan, Labour Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Law in Context Series, 
2012).
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We might find a sufficient explanation in the fact that Brian Langille 
had been a student of, and in the school of, Innis Christie; the disciples 
often become more zealous than the original prophet. Or we might want 
to reflect on the way in which Brian Langille likes to seek out a challenge 
or take up a contrarian position in the face of established orthodoxy. 
However, I think that there was more to it than that; Brian Langille had 
a special and driving enthusiasm for individual employment law because 
he judged that it pursued goals and expressed values that he regarded as 
supremely important, and that it had the potential to do so more directly 
and effectively than collective labour law was doing or was likely to do in 
the foreseeable future. He believed in essence that collective labour law 
had become somewhat exclusive and elitist in its lack of out-reach to the 
“have-nots” in the non-unionized sector,14 and that individual employment 
law had the potential to form the basis of a legal discipline that would 
secure equal concern and respect for all members of the workforce.
This represented a noble ambition on his part, to be esteemed 
as such. In this he was catching the incoming tide of constitutional 
equality and human rights law in the employment sphere. This was part 
of a drive towards equality and fairness of treatment for all workers—
eventually towards their human flourishing, so that he is now attracted 
by the capabilities approach. But while admiring Brian Langille for those 
aspirations, and for that reason taking seriously the idea that “labour 
law is a subset of employment law,” we may want to question whether 
“employment law,” as formulated by Innis Christie and his followers, or 
for that matter “individual employment law” as envisaged by Bob Hepple 
and Paul O’Higgins, was ever going to be the vehicle for the achievement 
of those high and laudable ideals. In particular, we may wonder whether 
a legal genre essentially constructed upon and around the common law of 
the contract of employment was going to have that capacity.
In a sense, we have an opportunity to evaluate that claim by looking 
at what has happened to “employment law” in the intervening years. 
For, although “employment law” was never formally advanced to pole 
position on the starting grid in the way that Brian Langille seemed to be 
advocating, it did nevertheless come to lead the field in a de facto sense by 
reason of the social and economic shift to which I have referred, namely 
the decline of collective bargaining and the contraction of the unionized 
sector of the workforce. So we can test out Brian Langille’s aspirational 
14. Langille, “Subset,” supra note 2 at 200: “There is a tendency to think of our law of the 
employment relationship as being neatly divided between ‘employment law’ which is law for the 
unorganized, and ‘labour law’ which is law for the organized. The former are the have-nots.”
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proposal that labour law should be viewed as a subset of employment law 
in a laboratory of real-world experience in which that proposal was to 
some extent substantively realized both in Canada and the UK.
In the remainder of this section, I offer such a stocktaking, which is 
focused mainly upon UK law because I do not presume to do more than 
suggest general and qualified analogies with Canadian law. This normative 
stocktaking will eventually try to home in on the relation between the 
“collective” and the “individual” aspects of labour or employment law. The 
stocktaking that I undertake here consists of assuming that Innis Christie, 
Brian Langille, Bob Hepple and Paul O’Higgins, and other proponents 
of “Employment Law” (Canadian style) or of “Individual Employment 
Law” (UK style) have been engaged in a certain normative pursuit—
with which I associate myself—and of asking whether that pursuit has 
been successful in its outcomes. This is, therefore, a kind of “cost/benefit 
analysis” in a broad sense. I earlier identified that normative pursuit, to 
remind the reader again if I may, as that of “chart[ing] and develop[ing] 
the worker-protective potential of the law of the contract of employment,” 
and the building of a statutory superstructure of employment rights and 
employment equality law upon those foundations15; so success or benefit 
will be measured according to an ideal of “worker-protection,” which we 
can think of as being aligned with the traditionally foundational notion 
for labour law of redressing the imbalance of power which is inherent in 
the individually bargained contract of employment. I will use the notion 
of “individual employment law” (IEL) as a convenient—albeit, for all the 
reasons I have given, controversial—shorthand to identify this common 
pursuit that we are evaluating. 
Let me begin with an optimistic assertion of the achievements of IEL. 
It has served, over the years of its evolution from the late 1960s and 1970s, 
to provide an indispensable technical and structural apparatus for a whole 
aspect of the legal regulation of labour and/or employment relations.  In 
that sense labour law simply could not have managed without IEL and was 
the richer for its development. I would even go so far as to say that IEL 
has had some success in developing, in particular, the “worker-protective 
potential of the law of the contract of employment”—that being one key 
aspect of the normative claim which I make for IEL, the normative mission 
which I attribute to its proponents, such as Innis Christie and Bob Hepple. 
I think that this success, such as it is, has consisted primarily in moves 
to characterize the contract of employment as embodying a continuing 
obligation of mutual trust and confidence between employer and employee 
15. See this discussion at Part I, above
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that conditions the shape, conduct and termination of the employment 
relationship, and further moves to ensure that a statutory floor of rights 
complements and supports that essential characterization.
We can and should debate whether and how far that goal was achieved. 
The UK courts seemed to be developing exactly such a purposive 
approach16 to IEL; that development reached its high-water mark in Malik 
v BCCI,17 in which the obligation of mutual trust and confidence as an 
implied obligation and inherent feature of contracts of employment was 
recognized by the House of Lords. This finding meant that the assertion that 
the corrupt central management of the bank had damaged the reputation 
and future employability of a branch manager, and other similarly placed 
employees, could become a contractual claim in the liquidation of the 
bank. This implied obligation seemed to offer the possibility, among 
others such as an expanded notion of “constructive dismissal” in the law 
of unfair dismissal, that the contractual claim for damages for wrongful 
dismissal could develop so as to circumvent restrictions upon the claim 
to compensation for unfair dismissal. But there was a major set-back in 
Johnstone v Unisys,18 where the implied obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence was limited in its application so that it did not govern the 
termination of the employment contract, in particular so that it did not 
enlarge the employer’s liability in damages for wrongful termination; 
although, that “Johnstone exclusion zone” was later limited in its scope.19 
There was what appeared to be a somewhat parallel evolution in 
Canada, from Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd20 in 1997 to Honda 
Canada Inc v Keays21 in 2008, consisting in a rise and partial fall in the idea 
of the contract of employment as a “good faith contract.” The majority in 
Honda did seem to give short shrift to the idea of the employment contract 
as a “good faith contract,” which the Court had recognized in Wallace in 
identifying an employer’s “duty of good faith and fair dealing” towards 
an employee. However, it was not the end of the story, as is demonstrated 
16. See infra, note 23.
17. Malik and Mahmud v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1997] UKHL 23, [1997] 
AC 20. The question of the nature and scope of the implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence 
has become central to the exposition of the law of the contract of employment in the UK—see eg 
Hugh Collins, “Implied Terms in the Contract of Employment” in Mark Freedland, ed, The Contract 
of Employment, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), chapter 22. This question has become bound 
up with the issue of whether and to what effect the contract of employment is to be regarded as a 
“relational contract”—see eg Douglas Brodie, “Relational Contracts” in Mark Freedland, ed, The 
Contract of Employment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), chapter 7.
18. Johnson v Unisys Limited [2001] UKHL 13.
19. Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc and McCabe v Cormwall CC [2004] UKHL 35. 
20. [1997] 3 SCR 701, 152 DLR (4th) 1.
21. 2008 SCC 39.
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notably by Boucher v Wal-mart,22 in which the Ontario Court of Appeal 
based its decision, at least in part, on a finding that Wal-mart had breached 
its “duty of good faith and fair dealing” towards the employee. In other 
words the “duty of good faith and fair dealing” seems to have survived, 
and can serve as a basis for damages, but it is still necessary for a plaintiff 
to demonstrate and quantify damages rather than have a court extend the 
notice period.
I shall say more in a moment about the question of how far there has 
been and is a purposive judicial approach23 to the positive development of 
IEL according to the normative goal that I have assigned to it.  But even 
if one thinks that at least the vestiges of such an approach remain, I want 
to acknowledge some of the costs or inherent problems that attach to the 
whole development of IEL and its increasing presence as a dominant, even 
in some ways the dominant dimension of labour and/or employment law. 
There is a series of such costs attaching to the development of IEL, and 
they can be traced back to an original tension, some might even say an 
original contradiction, in the aspiration of constructing a worker-protective 
body of law in the context of the British common-law based tradition 
on the foundation of the individual contract of employment. There are 
many such problems. I have touched on one of them as embodied in the 
Malik/ Johnson v Unisys and Wallace/ Honda v Keays case law; but I shall 
concentrate on two such problems, which I shall identify as, firstly, that of 
labour market elitism and exclusion, and secondly that of individualism 
and de-collectivization.
The problem of labour market elitism and exclusion consists in the 
propensity of IEL to become a body of law that caters increasingly to 
a wealthy elite of employees and fails to fulfil a protective function for 
vulnerable or disadvantaged workers—an ironical reversal of the original 
situation in Canada in which Brian Langille could identify a sector of the 
workforce who were “the have-nots of labour law”24 whose needs IEL was 
designed to address. There are several causes for this reversal, but two in 
particular stand out. The first cause of labour market elitism consists in a set 
of access to justice issues that loom increasingly large in the field of IEL. 
In particular, litigation to enforce contracts of employment has become so 
prohibitively expensive and hazardous that it has reverted to being largely 
the province of senior managers and “employed entrepreneurs”; a situation 
22. 2014 ONCA 419.
23. As to which, reference should be made to Guy Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
24. Langille, “Subset,” supra note 2 at 200; see supra note 14.
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vividly illustrated by cases such as Commerzbank v Keen,25 and Société 
Générale v Geys26 in which such claimants became the flag-bearers for 
the development of the “mutual obligation of trust and confidence.” This 
was a negative effect on access to justice, which was complemented by the 
introduction in 2013 of conspicuously high employment tribunal fees for 
claiming statutory employment rights but offset by the abolition (and even 
repayment) of those fees following the decision of the Supreme Court of 
the UK in Unison in 2017.27
The other principal cause of labour market elitism and exclusion, which 
is a major problem in British law and practice, is the exclusionary operation 
of the category of the contract of employment as the pre-condition for the 
enjoyment of many statutory employment rights.  This has an exclusionary 
effect because it requires continuing mutual obligation, which excludes 
many casual workers. Further, it tolerates both the re-constituting of 
an increasing proportion of employment relations as relations of self-
employment and the triangulation of employment relations by the insertion 
of an intermediary sub-contractor or employment agency to preclude 
the existence of a contract of employment with the actual end-user of a 
worker’s services. The UK Supreme Court famously took a strong line 
against “sham self-employment” in Autoclenz v Belcher,28 but this does 
not deal with the problems of mutuality of obligation or triangulation of 
employment arrangements between workers, end-users of their services, 
and intermediary agencies of various kinds. In short, the doctrine of 
“sham self-employment” is proving insufficiently robust to control the 
growth of a “gig economy” constructed on a business model of zero-hours 
contracting and deeply embedded self-employment arrangements. There 
is now a great body of case law and literature on this topic. The case law 
is not mono-directional in this respect; there are real advances, and it is 
useful to make reference to Uber BV v Aslam29 as a recent example of 
the UK courts grappling with not merely the legal realities but also the 
practical realities of the gig economy; here, the Court of Appeal in England 
decided that the claimant Uber drivers were “workers” and as such entitled 
to protection under the National Minimum Wage Act and the Working 
Time Directive—a victory of course, but a qualified one by contrast with 
25. Commerzbank AG v Keen [2006] EWCA Civ 1536.
26. Société Générale, London Branch v Geys [2012] UKSC 63.
27. R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 5; see Abi Adams-Prassl & Jeremias Adams-
Prassl, “Vexatious Claims: Challenging the Case for Employment Tribunal Fees” (2017) 80:3 Mod L 
Rev 412. 
28. Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41.
29. [2018] EWCA Civ 2748.
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their being recognized as acceding to the inner circle of “employees.” To 
somewhat similar effect was the decision of the UK Supreme Court in 
Pimlico Plumbers Ltd v Smith30 that the plumbers working for Pimlico 
Plumbers under a markedly independent model of self-employment should 
nevertheless be regarded as “workers” within limb (b) of section 230(1) of 
the Employment Rights Act 1996 (and also as being in “employment” for 
the purpose of section 83(2) of the Equality Act 2010. 
However, my second major concern about IEL is that of its propensity 
to be conducive of individualism and de-collectivization in labour and 
employment law. I will develop the theme in the context of British law 
but will also refer to a closely analogous set of issues in Canadian law. 
I believe that the theory and practice of IEL, by focusing itself upon 
the individual employment relation, and even more particularly upon 
the individual employment relation as embodied in the contract of 
employment, inherently encourages a mindset in which the employment 
relation is viewed with an individualistic and contractualist disposition. 
The analysis and regulation of the individual contractual employment 
relation does not necessarily have to be individualistic or contractualist; 
but it readily becomes so, especially in the hands of the common law 
appellate courts, which seem strongly pre-disposed to such an approach. 
In particular, this can lead to the marginalization and down-grading of the 
legal protection and support of collective bargaining.
We can see this kind of marginalization going on at various different 
levels. A significant manifestation of the trend consists in the fact that 
the exclusionary effect of the narrow scope accorded to the contract of 
employment may bear just as hard on rights to trade membership and 
activity as upon more straightforwardly individual employment rights; 
we could see this happening in the UK appellate courts in cases such as 
Consistent Group Ltd v Kalwak,31 where the Court of Appeal seemed, in 
the context of the statutory rights to trade union membership and activity, 
to draw back from a vigorous development of the doctrine of “sham self-
employment.”32 We have subsequently seen an extensive development of 
this jurisprudence, as mentioned above; this case itself concerned a classic 
example of the migrant gig-economy agency worker under a zero-hours 
contract. 
30. [2018] UKSC 29.
31. [2008] EWCA Civ 430. 
32. See Mark Freedland & Nicola Kountouris, “Some Reflections on the ‘Personal Scope’ of 
Collective Labour Law” (2017) 46:1 Indus LJ 52.
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I think, however, that we find an even deeper form or manifestation 
of individualistic and de-collectivizing approaches stemming from the 
growing prominence of IEL. I think it was a certain IEL mindset that gave 
rise to the, for many British labour law scholars, quite notorious decision 
of the House of Lords in Wilson v Associated Newspapers.33 There, the 
House of Lords ruled that the statutory individual right to trade union 
membership and activity was not violated by the practice of incentivizing 
workers to move from contracts with terms determined by collective 
bargaining to so-called “individual” contracts of employment, which were 
nominally negotiated with each employee individually, but in reality, were 
imposed as standard form contracts by the employing enterprise. Infusing 
the thinking of the House of Lords was not only a very thin conception of 
the right to trade union membership, but also a perception of the contractual 
employment relationship as in any case an essentially individual one, so 
that there was nothing violatory of the employee’s right to freedom of 
association in paying her or him a premium for choosing to conduct that 
relationship outside the umbrella of the collective bargaining process. 
I am deeply convinced that this is a thought pattern that is encouraged 
by the conceptual separation of IEL from collective labour law. In the 
British context, a corrective was administered by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) to which Wilson and Palmer took a case against 
the UK for maintaining a legal regime that had that outcome. In Wilson 
and Palmer v UK, the ECHR famously held that such a regime failed to 
give effect to the right of freedom of association, which was conferred by 
the European Convention on Human Rights, and the UK government had 
to respond by proposing amending legislation.34 
33. Associated Newspapers Ltd v Wilson, Palmer v Associated British Ports [1995] UKHL 2, [1995] 
2 AC 454.
34. Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v the United Kingdom, [2002] ECHR 552. 
The legislation was somewhat restricted in its scope; a challenge to those restrictions as being in 
violation of the European Convention on Human Rights has been mounted in recent litigation in 
a case which has progressed as far as the UK Court of Appeal at the time of writing—Kostal UK 
Ltd v Dunkley [2019] EWCA Civ 1009; [2020] ICR 217. The Court of Appeal rejected the claim on 
the basis of a narrow interpretation of the amending legislation: a powerful note on the decision by 
Alan Bogg and Keith Ewing argues that the Court of Appeal’s decision places undue weight on the 
difficult to ascertain intention or mental state of the employing enterprise when it engages in actions 
disruptive of its recognition for collective bargaining of a union or unions: Alan Bogg & Keith Ewing, 
“Collective Bargaining and Individual Contracts in Kostal UK Ltd v Dunkley: A Wilson and Palmer 
for the Twenty-First Century?” (2020) 49 Indus LJ .
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The Canadian jurisprudence in the cases of Dunmore,35 Health 
Services,36 and Fraser,37 became equally famous, and indicated that 
something similar to the doings in the House of Lords in Wilson & Palmer 
was occurring in the Supreme Court of Canada in Fraser, namely the 
implementation of a subtly individualistic retrenchment upon the right 
to freedom of association and collective bargaining. In Dunmore and 
Health Services, the SCC had taken positive approaches to the freedom 
of association provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in the 
former case to the effect that the absence of a legislative framework of 
protection of the associational rights of agricultural workers in Ontario 
violated those provisions of the Charter and its equality provision, and in 
the latter case, in the context of British Columbia health service provisions, 
a highly significant revindication of “labour rights as human rights” and 
a clear declaration of a right to collectively bargain as a “constitutional 
right” supported by the Charter. 
Fraser was another of the many key decisions taken in the context of 
the freedom of association rights of agricultural workers in Ontario, and 
the various legislative attempts to maintain those rights without actually 
bringing those workers within the archetypal framework of the Labour 
Relations Act, ie the Wagner Act, model itself. In Fraser, the SCC majority 
reasons clearly reaffirmed the basic conclusion of Health Services that 
“freedom of association” encompasses a right to collectively bargain. 
However, they did so in a way that emphasised that the earlier case did 
not give a right to a particular model of collective bargaining. Thus, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal had been incorrect in finding that a meaningful 
good faith bargaining right required the importation of Wagner Act model 
notions of exclusivity of representation and majoritarianism, or a statutory 
mechanism for resolving bargaining impasses and disputes regarding the 
interpretation or administration of any collective agreement. So the SCC 
took the overall view that the more limited version of collective bargaining 
rights embodied in the Ontario Agricultural Employees Protection Act of 
1992 was constitutionally valid, which was a set-back from the ambitions 
that had been encouraged by Health Services.
However, the SCC’s decision in Mounted Police Assn of Ontario v 
Canada38 amounted to a repudiation of at least some of Fraser, in particular 
reinforcing collective bargaining as a constitutional right and emphasizing 
35. Dunmore v Ontario (AG), 2001 SCC 94.
36. Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007 
SCC 27.
37. Ontario (AG) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20.
38. 2015 SCC 1. 
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the “choice” of workers to select an “independent” bargaining agent. In 
that case, very briefly summarized, the RCMP had established a body with 
representatives elected by RCMP officers. That body was consulted by the 
employer on a number of issues, but did not (said the majority of the SCC) 
“collectively bargain” and lacked the necessary independence from the 
employer to satisfy the employees’ rights to freedom of association under 
section 2(d) of the Charter. Hence, it was found that statutory provisions 
that forbade RCMP officers from accessing collective bargaining rights 
available to other employees were unconstitutional.  
I return to the point that the development of Individual Employment 
Law does not need to, and preferably should not, give rise to or encourage 
the marginalization of the collective interest in the overall framework 
of labour and/or employment law. However, this brief stocktaking has 
indicated that there have been and are likely to continue to be those costs 
and downsides to the development of “employment law” as a distinct 
discipline of “individual employment law.” I therefore think that there 
are real dangers in allowing an ideology of individual employment law 
to become dominant, or of regarding “employment law” conceived of 
primarily as individual employment law as the over-arching intellectual 
discipline, in the domain of labour and employment relations. In the next 
section, I argue for a way to integrate and balance collective labour law 
and individual employment law in a unified discipline, and in conclusion I 
suggest that, despite appearances to the contrary, we could view this as the 
underlying objective of Brian Langille’s proposition that “labour law is a 
subset of employment law.” 
III. The re-integration of labour law and employment law
In the preceding sections of this paper, I have described the construction 
of “employment law” in Canada and of employment law in the sense of 
individual employment law in the UK. I have identified this as the special 
work of Innis Christie in Canada, and as a movement which was led by 
Bob Hepple and Paul O’Higgins in the UK, and I have remarked upon the 
way in which that tendency in the UK was influential upon Innis Christie’s 
thinking in Canada. I have critically analysed Brian Langille’s argument 
for the advancement of “employment law” to the point where it could be 
said that “labour law is a subset of employment law”; and I have surveyed 
the actual evolution of “employment law” or “individual employment 
law” in the UK and Canada to assess the merits of that claim. 
This has led me to the view that there needs to be a fundamental 
integration or re-integration of labour law and employment law in both 
jurisdictions. In this concluding section I briefly show how Harry Arthurs 
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demonstrated that need when paying tribute to Innis Christie and his work 
in 2011. I consider his proposed method of effecting that integration on even 
terms between labour law and employment law. I then propose somewhat 
different means of achieving that desirable end; and finally, I argue that 
such an integration is compatible with, even on a certain interpretation 
fully in line with, Brian Langille’s thinking as initially expressed in his 
thesis that “labour law is a subset of employment law.”
So, as I have begun to indicate, I became convinced in the course 
of my reflections on the construction and evolution of “employment 
law” that, valuable in many ways as that original construction had been 
and encouraging in some ways as the subsequent evolution had been, it 
was nevertheless very important for there to be a balanced integration 
or re-integration between labour law and employment law, and that this 
demanded a different approach from the one apparently proposed by Brian 
Langille in “Subset.” As at many stages of this little voyage of discovery 
or re-discovery, I was reminded that Harry Arthurs had, like Amundsen 
preceding Scott to the North Pole, got there before me. In his inaugural 
Innis Christie lecture, he had identified this necessity. He pointed to 
the key changes which were occurring in the world of work, the trends 
away from collective bargaining and towards precarious employment or 
self-employment, and said, most powerfully and memorably, that a new 
approach was needed:
Because of this fluidity in the status and rights of workers, labour law 
ought to be able to manage transitions, reconcile anomalies and cope with 
ambiguities. But it can do none of those things well if its administrators, 
subjects and beneficiaries inhabit multiple policy domains, each regulated 
by a distinct legal regime.39
Harry Arthurs accordingly canvassed alternative ways of mapping out 
a composite and over-arching legal discipline that could transcend the 
divisions between “labour law” and “employment law,” between the 
unionized and non-unionized sectors of the workforce, between the domains 
of “employment” and “self-employment,” and so forth. He considered 
doing so in a sociological genre of legal pluralism, by envisaging the 
discipline as “the law of the workplace” and concentrating on workplaces 
as the seats of distinctive multi-layered local regimes.40 He also considered 
the trend towards unifying the discipline by constitutionalizing it, that is 
to say by fashioning it as a composite location of constitutional law and 
39. Arthurs, supra note 3 at 8.
40. Ibid at 10.
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constitutional principles.41 However, he rejected those methodologies 
in favour of a third alternative, namely that of basing the over-arching 
discipline upon “the deep structures of political economy,” and therefore 
thinking of it as “the law of labour market regulation.”42 This seemed to 
him to be the best way of creating an overall “map of labour law”—and 
therefore, to my mind, an over-arching discipline—which would be truly 
responsive to the underlying dynamics of the evolving world of work, 
which he styled as “labour market tectonics.”43
I see the great force of that argument, and as I have indicated, I share 
Harry Arthurs’ view of the importance of the quest for an over-arching and 
unificatory formulation of our shared legal discipline, which will transcend, 
in particular, any schism between “labour law” and “employment law.” 
However, I would prefer to pursue that quest not so much by choosing a 
prevailing methodology for the over-arching discipline and naming the 
discipline accordingly—I think it should be open to deploying all the 
methodologies that Harry Arthurs singled out, and others besides—but 
rather by seeking out and adopting a name for the composite discipline, 
which is not partisan as between different genres or ways of doing the 
subject, and which is inclusive of all its categories or sub-categories. This 
involves seeking a unifying concept that transcends the division between 
“labour law” and “employment law” in a system like Canada’s where 
those terms denote distinct disciplines—a concept, moreover, that sheds 
some difficult historical baggage in a system like the UK’s, where those 
terms have become largely interchangeable in denoting a single discipline 
but still retain some slightly divisive nuances of difference between 
collectivist and individualist approaches. 
The quest for the unificatory formulation, understood in that way, is 
a difficult one. I cannot hope to find a silver bullet that could pierce a 
clean hole through a complex accumulation of practically intricate and 
ideologically charged linguistic history. Any given proposal which came 
close to fulfilling my objective might easily appear to be at once contrived, 
anodyne, and evasive. Having made those apologies in advance, I propose 
“the Law of Work Relations” as an over-arching terminology and concept 
to encapsulate our discipline. This may not command widespread favour, 
but it does sidestep the rift or remaining cracks between “labour law” and 
“employment law”; and it does also, deliberately, break the barrier between 
41. Ibid at 10-13.
42. Ibid at 13-16. At 15, n 52, he acknowledges some antecedents of this terminology, such as Simon 
Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment and Legal 
Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
43. Arthurs, supra note 3 at 14.
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“employment” and “self-employment” that still in my view manages to 
cramp and enclose the body of law that is the subject of our study and 
scholarship. Moreover, and I say this rather sadly, I think it helps to make 
another more subtle but also necessary transition in the way that we 
approach that subject. Just as an earlier generation had to lay the ghost of 
“master and servant law,” so I believe we have to move past the perception 
that this body of law is constructed on the basis of the common law of the 
contract of employment, going towards a fuller and more rounded view of 
its essential sources. I hope this proposed concept and terminology might 
be slightly conducive in that direction. 
Conclusion
I may have appeared to wander some way from Brian Langille’s thesis 
that “labour law is a subset of employment law”; but in conclusion I revert 
to some further reflection upon it. It could be supposed that, in proposing 
the category of “the Law of Work Relations,” I am squarely repudiating 
Langille’s view of the proper shape of the discipline and of the relationship 
between its component parts. It might appear that I am proposing a friendly 
merger on equal terms between “labour law” and “employment law” into 
a new corporate entity of work relations law, while he was suggesting a 
hostile takeover of labour law by employment law, a reversal of previous 
roles whereby employment law would now be the big brother and labour 
law the new “little sister.”44 But I believe it is not so. It is true that there 
was some animosity towards “labour law” in Langille’s proposal and his 
rhetoric in support of that proposal; he had come to regard labour law as 
an apparatus which protected the “haves” in the unionized sector to the 
neglect of the “have-nots” in the non-unionized sector.45 However, I think 
his purpose was not actually that of cutting labour law down to size or 
demoting it to the ranks and placing it under the officiation of employment 
law; it was, properly understood, that of achieving something much more 
like an integration between labour law and employment law on equal 
terms of the kind which Harry Arthurs was proposing in 2011 and which 
I am now suggesting. 
I now think that the appearance to the contrary, namely that Langille 
was straightforwardly proposing the hierarchical subordination of labour 
law to “employment law” as then newly constituted by the work of Innis 
Christie and others, was a misleading one: and I have formed that view for 
the following reason. I believe that, in adopting the mantra that “labour law 
44. See Judy Fudge, “Reconceiving Employment Standards Legislation: Labour Law’s Little Sister 
and the Feminization of Labour” (1991) 7 JL & Soc Pol’y 73.
45. See supra note 14.
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is a subset of employment law,” Langille was choosing an over-elliptical 
headline that was somewhat distorting of his real intention. Crucially, I think 
that he saw the need to merge both “labour law” and “employment law” 
into a single over-arching discipline with a new and composite identity. If 
so, it was I think a misstep to use the terminology of “employment law” 
to denote this new composite discipline. There are signs in the article that 
he was experimenting with “the Law of the Employment Relationship” as 
a new composite terminology,46 and we should read the article as if he had 
boldly gone right down that terminological path. So the slogan “labour law 
is a subset of employment law” would expand out into the more elaborate 
proposition that “Labour Law, as also Employment Law itself, is a sub-set 
of The Law of the Employment Relationship.” That would have been far 
too cumbersome to form an arresting title for his article, but I like to think 
that it would more accurately have expressed its real intention. 
I am glad to arrive at that view, because it enables me to celebrate 
more wholeheartedly the high normative objectives that, as I have 
indicated, I regard as having animated Brian Langille’s article. Even on 
that view, there is still a debate about how to balance the collective and 
the individual elements in the composite package, and about whether we 
need to fear an individualistic bias, which threatens to impose itself in 
an increasingly de-collectivized socio-economic environment. That is a 
question, incidentally, that also needs to be asked about the “capabilities 
approach,” and one that is discussed in the recently published symposium 
volume on that subject, which Brian Langille has edited.47 However, that 
is a discussion with which I feel much more comfortable about having 
with him on the understanding of his “sub-set” thesis as being to the effect 
which I have now suggested. 
I think that this discussion should be held between all scholars and 
practitioners in the field, on the footing that we are in the business of 
pursuing an integrated vision of the discipline that combines the pursuit 
of a strong collective voice for all workers and a humane notion of equal 
concern and respect for all of them, with a strategic regulation of the 
labour market towards those aims. In short, there needs to be an inclusive 
46. See Langille, “Subset,” supra note 2 at 200: “There is a tendency to think of our law of the 
employment relationship as being neatly divided between ‘employment law’ which is law for the 
unorganized, and ‘labour law’ which is law for the organized” [emphasis added]; and, at 201: “It 
is possible and important to take a broader and more unified view of our law of the employment 
relationship. From this view collective bargaining law is a subset of employment law” [emphasis 
again added].
47. See Brian Langille, ed, The Capability Approach to Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2019), especially Brian Langille, “Introduction: The Capability Approach to Labour Law—
Why Are We Here?” 
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out-reach into precarious work relations and towards vulnerable workers 
in whatever legal, social, or transactional situation they are to be found. If 
so, the endeavours of all those whose work is considered in this re-visiting 
of “employment law” will have been reconciled in a productive way. 
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